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NOTE
IN WHAT OFTEN APPEARS TO BE A CRAPSHOOT
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, CONGRESS THROWS
SNAKE EYES WHEN IT ENACTS THE INDIAN
GAMING REGULATORY ACT
I.

INTRODUCTION

Oscar Wilde once mused in his piece, The Balladof Reading Gaol:
And once, or twice, to throw the dice
Is a gentlenzanly game,
But he does not win who plays with Sin
In the Secret House of Shame.'

Although the purely written romantic era of Oscar Wilde is long
past us, and today's modem gambling parlors are now referred to,

antiseptically, as casinos, some still regard casinos as a "[s]ecret [h]ouse
of [s]hame," as invidious institutions of depravity, yielding no true

winners.2 Visibly, this puritan notion is the minority view, as today a
person can make a legal bet, whether it is in a local lottery or on a green

felt-wrapped roulette table, in all but two American states? Despite its
somewhat furtive reputation, today, gambling is a pervasive, ever
profitable industry in the United States, and an industry which will
foreseeably continue to flourish with the proliferation of Indian gaming
1. OSCARWILDF, THE BALAD OF READING GAOL20 (1937) (quotation marks omitted).
2. See generally 141 CONG. REC. S10,912-14 (daily ed. July 31, 1995).

"There is a substantial economic case to be made against gambling. It involves simply
sterile transfers of money or goods between individuals, creating no new money or
goods. Although it creates no output, gambling does nevertheless absorb time and
resources. When pursued beyond the limits of recreation ... gambling subtracts from the
national income."
Id. 141 CONG. REc. S10,914 (statement of Sen. Simon quoting Paul Samuelson, Nobel Prizewinning economist) (alteration in original); Patricia Simms, Study Says Gambling Is State Loser:
Societal Costs Are High, Wis. ST. J., Apr. 10, 1995, at IA.

3. See Francis X. Clines, Gambling, Pariah No More. Is Booming Across America. N.Y.
T"Is,

Dec. 5, 1993, at 1.
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facilities. The gambling industry grosses revenues in excess of fifty

billion dollars, and of this amount Indian gaming accounts for
approximately eight billion dollars. In a recently published report

propounded by the National Gambling Impact Study Commission, the
commission "note[d] that in 1996-97... Indian gambling revenues grew

by 16.5%, [and] commercial casino revenues [grew] by 4.8%."'
According to the report, tribal enterprises "now account for about 20%
of all U.S. casino revenues, and their operations, taken as a whole, are

now larger than those in Atlantic City and about half as large as those in
Nevada."6 Operating "Las Vegas-style" casinos in fourteen states, and
gambling operations in thirty-one states, Indian tribes now control 260
gaming facilities stretching from Florida to Washington.7 What explains

this phenomenon; this rampant growth in Indian gambling enterprises?
After all, in 1988, Indian gaming operations only grossed $212 million,
and today that "meager" amount has increased by more than thirty-five

times over.'
"The rise of Indian-owned casinos is an outgrowth of legislation
enacted by Congress in the form of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of
1988" ("IGRA" or the "Act").9 "Pushed by western Democrats with
large Indian populations back home, the new law permitted recognized
tribes in almost all states to negotiate terms for offering gambling."' ° As

a result of the IGRA, Indian gaming has grown into a powerful, billion-

4. See Revenues from Legal Gambling Grew Nearly 1,600% from 1976-1997, RES. ALERT,
Oct. 15, 1999, at 1, 1 [hereinafter Revenues]; Dan Seligman, The Winning Hand: The $8 Billion
Indian Gaming Industry Remains in a Fierce Growth Phase. This Can't Be Good for Non-Idian
Gainers,FORBES, July 26, 1999, at 76, 76.
5. Seligman, supra note 4, at 76.
6. Id.
7. See Revenues, supra note 4, at 1; William G. Flanagan & James Samuelson, The New
Buffalo-But Who Got the Meat?: A Laiv Aimed at Relieving Poverty on Indian Reservations Makes
a Handful of People-Some with One-Sixteenth PartIndian Blood-Very, Very Rich, FORBES, Sept.
8, 1997, at 148, 148.
8. See Revenues, supra note 4, at 1; Seligman, supra note 4, at 76.
9. Anthony Layng, Indian Casinos: Past Precedents and Future Prospects: Those
Reservations that Do Not Use Their Gambling Profits Wisely Could Find Themselves with
Economic Woes Once the Well Dries Up in the Face of IncreasedCompetition, USA TODAY, Mar.
1996, at 70,72.
10. Flanagan & Samuelson, supra note 7, at 150. If a state allows any form of gambling, such
as a lottery or Las Vegas nights at a local church, then the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988
("IGRA" or "the Act") permits an Indian tribe to request that a state enter into negotiations for the
establishment of a tribal casino operation. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (1994). "Class III gaming
activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such activities are.., located in a State that permits
such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity ... "/d.
I § 2710(d)(l)(B).
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dollar industry that continues to prosper and expand." IGRA gambling
operations provide for tribal economic growth, better schooling,
modernized infrastructures on reservation lands, and improved health
care for tribe members. Furthermore, the IGRA, promotes economic
independence, as gambling revenues go toward advancing tribal selfsufficiency, and the creation of casino associated jobs works towards
decreasing an unemployment problem that plagues today's Indian
tribes. 3 But as Congressman Ben "Night-horse" Campbell notes, "Indian
gaming is no economic panacea."'" Rather, it affords economic
revitalization only to the select few tribes that are privileged and
fortunate enough to maintain the resources necessary to carry on largescale gaming; for example, a tribe located proximate to a booming
metropolis. 5 Much to the chagrin of the western politicians who pushed
the IGRA through Congress, "out West, where most American Indians
dwell, big tribes like the Navajos continue to live in squalor."' 6 The

Navajo reservation, which spans across Arizona, Utah, and New
Mexico, "is home to about 200,000 tribe members[, yet tihey are among
the poorest people in the [United States] ....There is not a single

casino operating on or planned for their lands."'"
After twelve years of being on the books, the IGRA has caused
quite a legal stir between the states, the Department of the Interior, and
the Indian tribes. It has been the subject of a landmark Supreme Court
decision, in which the Court held that the IGRA violated a state's

11.

See Todd S. Purdum, Indian Tribes Approre Gambling Compacts with California,N.Y.

TiMrs, Sept. 11, 1999, at A8.
Gov[emor] Gray Davis and more than 50 California Indian tribes agreed (on Septemb.-r
10, 1999] to binding compacts intended to keep slot machines operating at Indian
casinos around the state, and the State Legislature voted to put a referendum on the

ballot next March to exempt tribes from the state Constitution's ban on casino gambling,
paving the way for a substantial expansion of gambling in the West.
Id.
12. See Naomi Mezey, The Distributionof Wealth, Sorereignty and Culture Through Indian
Gaming, 48 STAN. L. REV. 711,727 (1996).
13. See id.
14. Ben Campbell, Indian Ganing Is No Economic Panacea,DE.,. POST, Dee. 26, 1994, at

7B. As of 1994, of the 550 federally recognized Indian tribes, only ninety-one of them oprated
gaming facilities on tribal lands. See id.

15. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 6.
Trump v. Babbitt, No. 93-1882 (D.NJ. filed Apr. 30, 1993) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Memorandum]

("The most successful Indian gambling operations are found on small reservations in Connecticut,
Minnesota and California close to the large population areas of Northern New Jersey and New
York, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and Los Angeles.") (on file with Hofstra Law Review).
16. Flanagan & Samuelson, supranote 7, at 148.
17. Id.
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Eleventh Amendment right to sovereign immunity from suit." In
addition to lethal Eleventh Amendment attacks, the IGRA has also
endured numerous constitutional blows on Tenth Amendment
infringement grounds, as well.' 9 It has also been the subject of countless
suits where Indian tribes have sought to compel the negotiation and
participation of states in furtherance of gaming compacts. Clearly, when
the western Democrats pushed the IGRA through Congress, they pushed
through quite the farrago of legislation. In exploring the constitutional
infirmities of the IGRA, this Note succinctly delves into the Tenth
Amendment implications of the IGRA and considers the IGRA's blatant
disregard for the precepts of the Tenth Amendment and the American
system of federalism. The argument proposed herein is as manifest as
the Tenth Amendment is brief.2 The IGRA violates the Tenth
Amendment because it requires a state to negotiate Tribal-State
compacts, it does not afford a state the option to refuse to regulate Class
III gaming,2 ' and it allows the Secretary of the Interior to commandeer
state governments to regulate Class III gaming."
Part II of this Note is primarily prefatory and foundational, and
therefore, discusses the history and the provisions of the IGRA. Part II
also explores current Tenth Amendment jurisprudence and philosophy,
federalism, and the concept of political accountability. Part III delves
into the Tenth Amendment implications of the IGRA, and argues that
the IGRA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' power in its
legislative foundation, in its statutory provisions, and in its practical
effect. Part III also focuses on a seminal case which upheld the IGRA
against Tenth Amendment attack, and rebuts its holding as parochial and
misguided, and further, demonstrates that it is inapplicable in light of
current Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. Finally, Part IV provides a
brief conclusion, summing up the arguments against the IGRA, while
offering a cursory solution to remedy the Act's unconstitutionality.

18. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,47,72-73 (1996).
19. See, e.g., Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1432 (10th Cir. 1994), rev'g in part
834 F. Supp. 1341 (W.D. Okla. 1992), aff'd on other grounds, 89 F.3d 690 (10th Cir. 1996)
[hereinafter Ponca Tribe II].
20. The Constitution provides in the Tenth Amendment that "[tihe powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively.... U.S. CONST. amend. X.
21. See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8) (1994). Class III gaming operations carry on commonly known
casino type games, such as blackjack, craps, roulette, and slot machine gambling. In addition to
banking card games and slots, Class III games also include racing venues, jai alai, and sports
wagering. See id.
22. See Ponca Tribe H, 37 F.3d at 1434.
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AN OVERVIEW OF THE IGRA AND THE TENTH AMENDMENT

A.

The History and Provisionsof the IGRA

The IGRA was enacted following the very controversial Supreme
Court decision, Califonzia i.Cabazon Band of Mission Indians!'In that
case, a majority of the Supreme Court held that the State of California
to prohibit the Cabazon tribe from operating bingo on
lacked jurisdiction
its reservation.1 4 "In this significant victory for the Indians, the Supreme
Court held that as long as state law did not explicitly prohibit a form of
gambling altogether, tribes could run games according to their own
" This decision
regulatory regimes, ignoring state or local laws ....
opened the floodgates for extensive gambling operations on Indian
lands.
Following Cabazon, there was substantial uncertainty as to the
extent to which, in the absence of a federal statute, the states could
legitimately regulate gambling on Indian reservations. How could the
states assure that the environs and the citizens surrounding the gaming
facilities would not be adversely impacted by new gambling operations?
With regard to crime prevention and law enforcement, did the states
have jurisdiction to patrol tribal lands? Could state taxes be levied
against Indian enterprises, or did federal law preempt such state
involvement or participation? There was great uncertainty as to where
the states stood in the landscape of Indian affairs. There was, however,
no uncertainty as to the federal government's position to regulate, as the
federal government exercises considerable and plenary power over
Indian affairs.? Additionally, there was no uncertainty as to whether the
federal government could permit and sanction the states to regulate
Indian gaming on their own. Cabazon clearly stated "that state laws may
be applied to tribal Indians on their reservations if Congress has
expressly so provided."" Faced with the uncertainty generated by the
Cabazon decision vis-a-vis which sphere of government should exercise
proper authority over the regulation of Indian gaming enterprises,
Congress enacted the IGRA to deal with Indian gaming and the issue of
state participation in the regulation of such.
23. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
at 221-22.
24. See id.
25. Stephanie A. Levin, Betting on the Land: Indian Gambling and Sorereignp 8 ST!AN. L &
POL'Y REV. 125, 127 (1997).
26. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 215.

27. Id. at 207.
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The IGRA, enacted by Congress in 1988, governs Indian gaming
on tribal reservations.28 The IGRA's stated purpose is to utilize gambling
enterprises financed and managed by non-Indians to "promot[e] tribal
economic development, [tribal] self-sufficiency, and strong tribal
governments."29 The IGRA divides gambling activities into three classes:
Class I (social games for prizes of minimal value),3" Class II (bingo and
similar games),3 ' and Class I (all other forms of gaming not provided
for in Class I or Class II).32
Under the IGRA, a recognized Indian tribe may seek permission to
permit Class Ill gaming activities on its reservation if five conditions are
met: (1) the governing body of the Indian tribe adopts a resolution
authorizing such gambling activities; (2) specific financial arrangements
are made for per capita payments to Indian tribe members; (3) the
Chairman of the National Indian Gaming Commission approves; (4) the
gaming activities are already permitted in the state "for any purpose by
any person, organization, or entity"; and (5) a Tribal-State compact is
entered into by the state and the Indian tribe.33
The fifth condition requires the states to enter into compact
negotiations "in good faith" at the tribe's request.' The states are
compelled to come to the bargaining table by the clear, directive
language of the statute. The statute does not simply authorize or offer the
states an opportunity to enter into Tribal-State compacts in order to
secure a say in how the gaming enterprise will operate; rather, it leaves
the states virtually no choice in deciding whether or not to participate.
The states must stamp their initials or emboss their wax seal to the
compact, or the deal does not take place. Under the IGRA, before a
federally recognized Indian tribe may engage in a Class III gaming
enterprise, the tribe and the state in which the reservation is located must
negotiate an agreement permitting the tribe to conduct gambling
operations." The IGRA states unambiguously that a "State shall
negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into.., a compact"
when the state receives a request from an Indian tribe to engage in
28. See 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (1994).
29. Id. §2702(l).
30. See id. § 2703(6).
31. See id. § 2703(7)(A).
32. See id. § 2703(8). Class IlI gaming operations carry on commonly known casino type
games, such as blackjack, craps, roulette, and slot machine gambling. In addition to banking card
games, Class Ill games also include racing venues, jai alai, and sports wagering. See id.
33. Seeid. § 2710(d).
34. See id. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
35. See id.
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"negotiations for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact
governing the conduct of gaming activities."" If the state refuses to do
so, or if a Tribal-State gambling compact is not entered into within 180
days after such a request, the Indian tribe may sue the state in federal
court to compel the state to negotiate in good faith.37 In that lawsuit, "the
burden of proof shall be upon the State to prove that the State has
negotiated with the Indian tribe in good faith to conclude a Tribal-State
compact governing the conduct of gaming activities."" If the state does
not meet the burden, the court must enter an order requiring the state and
the Indian tribe to conclude a compact within sixty days." If a compact
is not concluded in that time, the tribe and the state must "submit to a
mediator appointed by the court a proposed compact that represents their
last best offer for a compact." ' If the mediator selects the tribe's
proposal, the Secretary of the Interior may implement it as the final
compact even though the state has expressly disapproved it.' The
compact is then complete, despite the unwillingness of the state to
participate in the negotiation process, or to advocate the final compact.
To thoroughly understand how the IGRA violates the Tenth
Amendment, a brief discussion of current Tenth Amendment
construction and interpretation is in order.
B. Federalism, the Tenth Amendment, and Political
Accountabili.,: Application, Interpretation,and
Construction in Recent Years
1. Federalism and the Tenth Amendment
The Constitution provides in the Tenth Amendment that "[t]he
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
36. Id.(emphasis added).
37. See id. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i). Although this federal cause of action exists in the statutory
language of the IGRA, any practical effect of the provision is now void. In 1996. the Supreme

Court, in Seminole Tribe v Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), invalidated a tribe's right to bring suit
against a state in federal court for not negotiating pursuant to the IGILA See id. at 72-73. The Court
based its holding on a state's sovereign immunity from federal prozess under the F!eventh

Amendment. See id. Although the cause of action no longer exists, it is still useful to explor the
provision in looking at the statute as a whole. Essentially. the IGRA anticipated using the judiciary
as the strong arm to command states to carry out federal policy, to do the wiork that Congr-ss could
not othervise do because of the Tenth Amendment's protection.
38. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii).
39. See id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii).

40. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)iv).
41. See id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii).
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respectively... ,,42 In Gregory v. Ashcroft,43 the Supreme Court noted
that the Tenth Amendment is the structural mechanism of the
Constitution fashioned by the Framers to assure that "'the States possess
sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government."'4 "The
Framers' experience.., had persuaded them that using the States as the
instruments of federal governance was both ineffectual and provocative
of federal-state conflict, ' 45 and therefore, they "rejected the concept of a
central government that would act upon and through the States, and
instead designed a system in which the State[s] and [the] Federal
Government[] would exercise concurrent authority over the people."46 In
adopting and ratifying the federal system, the Framers and the states
understood that the states would explicitly "retain substantial sovereign
authority."4'7 What is derived from this language is that the states and the
federal government are coequal sovereigns, and therefore, the federal
government may not directly regulate the states, or "conscript state
[agencies] into the national bureaucratic army."48 The preservation of
state power and autonomy is thus essential to the preservation of the
federal system.
a. New York v. United States
In New York v. United States,49 New York State brought an action
against the United States challenging the constitutionality of certain
provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments
Act of 1985 (the "Waste Act"). ° The Supreme Court held that the "take
title" provision of the Waste Act was unconstitutional as it violated the
Tenth Amendment by compelling the states to carry out certain
potentially unpopular actions relating to the disposal of low-level
radioactive waste in furtherance of the federal will." The Court
explained that "Congress may not ... 'commandee[r] the legislative

42. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
43. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
44. Id. at 457 (quoting Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990)).
45. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997).
46. Id. at 919-20.
47. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992)
("[T]he Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits
that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States.").
48. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,775 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
49. 505 U.S. 144.
50. See id. at 154.
51. See id. at 186-88.
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processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce
a federal regulatory program. '
The Waste Act was designed by Congress to deal with the thenexisting shortage of radioactive waste disposal sites in thirty-one states. 3
The Waste Act created a duty on the part of the states to regulate the
disposal of low-level radioactive waste produced within their borders."
To induce compliance with this obligation, the Waste Act offered three
distinct "incentives.

'

The first incentive was monetary in nature, with Congress using its
purse strings to puppeteer the states into action.! This "monetary"
incentive functioned on three levels; first, states that presently operated
disposal sites were authorized to collect a surcharge, a nominal "tax," on
radioactive byproducts received from their sister states." The states
would then submit a portion of the collection proceeds to the Secretary
of Energy, who would then place the money in an escrow account."3 Unsited states, that had successfully developed disposal arrangements in
accordance with the federal guidelines, would receive a portion of the
escrow fund.59 Hence, the monetary incentive to regulate.
The second incentive, the so-called "access" incentive, authorized
the states that were equipped to properly dispose of radioactive waste to
gradually raise the cost of access to their sites." This would ultimately
work to preclude access entirely to those
states that had yet to meet the
6
federal guidelines for waste disposal.
The third, and clearly the most controversial incentive is commonly
referred to as the "take title" provision.6 This provision provides that if a
state does not comply with the Waste Act, and fails to develop a
functional plan for the disposal of all radioactive waste generated within
its borders by a specified date, it must, at the demand of waste
producers, take title to the waste, take physical possession of the waste,
and furthermore, accept all liability for damages suffered by the waste

52. Id. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264.288
(1981)) (first alteration in original).
53. See id.
at 150-51.
54. See id.
55. See id.
at 152.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
at 153.
61. See id.
62. See U
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producer as a result of the state's failure to properly plan for the disposal
of the waste.63
New York State chose to regulate, and in compliance with the
Waste Act's requirements, enacted legislation setting forth a
comprehensive plan for the financing and siting of a disposal facility."
Citizens who resided in the vicinity of the potential sites were
vehemently opposed to the prospect of radioactive waste being so close
to home, and with deafening cries of "not in my back yard," they
protested. 65 With the citizenry's cries too loud for the Empire State to
endure, the state abandoned ship, and instead filed suit against the
United States, citing the Waste Act as unconstitutional, namely, in
derogation of the Tenth Amendment. 6
In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice O'Connor
perfunctorily noted the constitutional basis of the issue at hand. "The
constitutional question is as old as the Constitution: It consists of
discerning the proper division of authority between the Federal
Government and the States." 67 Framed even more precisely, the issue at
hand is to what extent and under what circumstances may "Congress...
use the States as implements of regulation." 8
The Court held that although Congress retains substantial authority
"under the Constitution to encourage the States to provide for the
disposal of the radioactive waste generated within their borders, the
Constitution does not confer upon Congress the ability simply to compel
the States to do so.''9 In so holding, the Court affirmed the
constitutionality of the "monetary" and "access" provisions in the Waste
Act, while striking down the "take title" provision as unconstitutional."
The Court recognized that there exists a fine line between congressional
encouragement and congressional coercion, and in advancing the "take
title" provision, Congress had transcended that line, a line that is
essential to the preservation of our federal form.7'

63. See id. at 153-54.
64. See id.at154.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 149.
68. Id. at 161.
69. Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
70. See id. at 171-77.
71. See id. at 175. "'[T]he preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their
governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the
Union and the maintenance of the [federal] government."' Id. at 162 (quoting Texas v. White, 7
Wall. 700,725 (1869)).
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Under the "take title" provision, states were given the "option" of
either regulating the disposal of the waste products pursuant to federal
mandate, or accepting ownership of low-level radioactive waste
produced within their borders if they did not so adhere.7 The "take title"
provision violated the Tenth Amendment by effectively forcing the state
to regulate in a particular area. If the state did not regulate and arrange
for disposal, then it would be forced to indemnify private waste
producers against tort damages if and when the generators were sued for
improper disposal. 73 Such an "option" forced the states to choose
between two alternatives that were each in derogation of the Tenth
"between two
Amendment. New York was compelled to choose
unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques. "' Because Congress
could not employ either of these methods alone, it could not escape the
problem by giving the state a choice between the two."1 "Either type of
federal action would 'commandeer' state governments into the service of
federal regulatory purposes, and would for this reason be inconsistent
with the Constitution's division of authority between federal and state
governments. 76

Properly reasoning that the states are sovereign bodies, and "not
mere political subdivisions[,] ...regional offices [or] administrative

agencies of the Federal Government,"'' the Court held that under the
Tenth Amendment, "one thing is clear: The Federal Government may
not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory
program.

b. Printz v. United States
In Printz v. United States,79 only five years after the Supreme
Court's decision in New York v UnitedStates, the Court was again faced
with a similar Tenth Amendment issue, namely, the constitutionality of
"the forced participation of the States' executive[s] in the actual
administration of a federal program."" At issue in Printz were the Tenth
Amendment implications of interim provisions found in the Brady
72. See id. at 174-75.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See id. at 175.
Id. at 176.
See id.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 188.
Id.
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Id. at 918.
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Handgun Violence Prevention Act (the "Brady Act"), which provided
that during the five-year period while the national handgun background
check system was being set up for future use, state officials, already
equipped with computerized check systems, would be required to
conduct these background checks."'
The Court explained that Congress may not compel the sovereign
states to carry out or administer a federal policy. The Court noted that no
matter how insignificant, menial, or ministerial the tasks are that would
facilitate the federal regulatory program, any imposition is violative of
the state's right to be free from federal command." After noting that in
New York, it had held "that Congress cannot compel the States to enact
or enforce a federal regulatory program," the Court went on to "hold that
Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the States'
officers directly."83 Justice Scalia noted that "[a]lthough the States
surrendered many of their powers to the new Federal Government,"''
they nonetheless maintained "'a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.''"
The Court held that "the whole object of the" Brady Act was "to direct
the functioning of the state executive, and hence to compromise the
structural framework of dual sovereignty ....It is the very principle of
separate state sovereignty that such a law offends ....
,,s6
By imposing
mandatory obligations on state law enforcement officers in furtherance
of the federal gun control program, Congress created a program that
"plainly runs afoul of'"s the rubric that "[t]he Federal Government may
neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular
problems, nor command the States' officers ... to administer or enforce
a federal regulatory program." 8 "[S]uch [mandatory] commands are
81. See id. at 902-05. "[The Brady Act purports to direct state law enforcement officers to
participate, albeit only temporarily, in the administration of a federally enacted regulatory scheme."
Id. at 904.
82. See id. at 925-35.
It is an essential attribute of the States' retained sovereignty that they remain
independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of authority. It is no more
compatible with this independence and autonomy that their officers be "dragooned" into
administering federal law, than it would be compatible with the independence and
autonomy of the United States that its officers be impressed into service for the
execution of state laws.
Id. at 928 (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 935.
84. Id. at918-19.
85. Id. at 919 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961)).
86. Id. at 932.
87. Id. at 933.
88. Id. at 935.
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fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual
sovereignty."
c. Political Accountability
Given that the very nature of our federal form is a dual system of
constitutional government, the Tenth Amendment acts as the mechanism
which preserves clear lines of power, decision, and political
accountability between the federal government and the independent

states." "It assures a decentralized government that will be more
sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases
opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes;.., and it

makes government more responsive by putting the States in competition
for a mobile citizenry."'" What is unique and grand about federalism and

the system of dual sovereignty is that in the United States, "our citizens
...have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each

protected from incursion by the other."9" It is "a legal system
unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of

government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its
own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and
are governed by it."93 The system of dual sovereignty was designed to

facilitate the distribution of political power between the state and federal
governments in order to guard against the abuses of governmental

power.' "This allocation of power between the federal and state
governments protects individuals from the danger of abuse by a single
sovereign." g Unfortunately though, a natural and inherent byproduct of
this power diffusion is political governmental obstruction, as "the
89. Id.
90. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) ("The [Tenth] [A]mndment states
but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered."): Texas v. United State3, 730 F.2d
339,356 (5th Cir. 1984) ("The Supreme Court has aftirmed the concept of federalism as a structural
assumption of the Constitution....").
91. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,458 (1991).
92. United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779. 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
93. Id.
94. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458. "'The "constitutionally mandated balance of oer"
between the States and the Federal Government was adopted by the Framers to ensure the protection
of "our fundamental liberties.".' Id. (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon. 473 U.S. 234. 242
(1985) (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528. 572 41985) jPowel. J.
dissenting))).
95. Jennifer A. Wiegleb, Strong-Arming the States to Conduct Background Checks for
Handgun Purchasers:An Analysis of State Autononmy, Political Accomntability, and the Brad)
Handgun Violence ProtectionAct, 48 WASH. U. J.URB. & CONTEMPt. L 373. 380-81 (1995).
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federal and state governments" are provided "with incentives and
opportunities to obscure which level of government is politically
responsible for unpopular policy choices."96
The federal government is provided a ripe and enticing opportunity
to hide behind the ever-opaque veil of the dual structure, and to set forth
policy, mandates, and regulations, through the indirect channels of the
state legislatures. 9 Where the federal government is faced with
unpopular policy decisions," the federal government might be motivated
to shift political accountability" to the states, so that the states too may
share in the public backlash if and when the choice proves to be
unembraced by the citizenry. I° Essentially, one sovereign is able to
effectively insulate itself from the political repercussions of the
electorate by employing another coequal sovereign as the vehicle to
carry out its policy. But where the federal government is able "to
achieve [its] desired goals and to insulate [itself] from voter wrath by
making responsibility difficult to trace," there is a breakdown of the
federal system.' °' Where this feigned "cooperative federalism"'"' exists,
there is political masking, and the result is that the voters are unable to
discern where liability should lie when election time rolls around.101 "If
people cannot locate the source of their distress ... they will not know
whom to vote out of office."'04 Consequently, although the federal
government drafted and voted on the statute, in the end, because the state
was stipulated as the mechanism to administer the regulatory policy, it is

96. See Note, Federalism, PoliticalAccountability, and the Spending Clause, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1419, 1419 (1994).
97. See Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 847, 867-70 (1979).
98. Consider, for example, a choice between offending Indian tribes by detracting from their
freedom to conduct business enterprises on their lands, or allowing Indian gambling operations on a
widespread basis throughout the nation.
99. See D. Bruce La Pierre, PoliticalAccountability in the National PoliticalProcess-The
Alternative to Judicial Review of FederalismIssues, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 577, 640 (1985) ("Political
accountability[, a necessary feature of democratic federalism,] is the 'answerability' of
representatives to the represented.").
100.

See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 131-

33 (1980).
101. Ann Althouse, Variations on a Theory of Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court
Dialogue,42 DUKE L.J. 979, 1018 (1993).
102. Kaden, supra note 97, at 870.
103. See Note, supra note 96, at 1419 ("Without clear lines of political accountability, the
system cannot function according to its constitutional design, because the inability to identify the
responsible level of government renders individuals less able to capitalize on the benefits of a dual
system of government.").
104. Althouse, supra note 101, at 1017.
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the state's political machine will take the blame and the brunt for the
federal government's handiwork 0 5
In New York v. United States,'o the Supreme Court elaborated on
the importance of political accountability in our federal structure:
[W]here the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the
accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished....
[Where state law is preempted,] it is the Federal Government that
makes the decision in full view of the public, and it will be federal
officials that suffer the consequences if the decision turns out to be
detrimental or unpopular. But where the Federal Government directs
the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt
of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the
regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral
ramifications of their decision. Accountability is thus diminished
when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in
accordance with the views of the local electorate in matters not preempted by federal regulation.'07
III.

HOw THE IGRA VIOLATES THE TENTH AMENDMENT
A.

The IGRA 's Compelled Negotiation Provisions

The IGRA by its very terms forces the sovereign states to
participate in Indian gaming at the will of the federal government,2
allowing Congress to "use the States as implements of regulation."I")
One need look no further than the face of the statute to see that the
IGRA requires states to negotiate with federally recognized tribes on
demand."' In no uncertain terms, the IGRA provides that upon request
by a federally recognized Indian tribe, "the State shall negotiate vith the
Indian tribe in good faith to enter into [a gaming] compact."" ..Shall"
being the operative word, there is no question that the states must engage
105. See Christopher T. Handman, Note, The Doctrineof PoliticalAcco:ntabiliy,and Supreme
Court Jurisdiction:Applying a New Erternal Constraintto Congress's Erceptions Clause Power,
106 YALE LJ.197,211 (1996).
106. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
107. Id. at 16-69.
108. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (1994) CIT]he State shall negotiate... in gczd faith to
enter into such a compact.") (emphasis added).
109. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 161.
110. See Rumsey Indian Rancheria of NWutun Indians v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250, 1253 (9th Cir.
1994) (Canby, J., dissenting) (stating the 'IGRA imposes on the states a duty to negotiate compacts
in good faith. That duty is enforceable in federal court... to dictate a compact").
111. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
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in lengthy negotiations with an Indian tribe at the tribe's request."'
Although the states do not ultimately have the chore of regulating Indian
gaming, per se, after the gaming compact is finalized," 3 the regulation is
carried out in accordance with the procedures that the states were

instrumental in drafting. Negotiation, thus, in effect, translates into
practical regulation. The IGRA's plain language demonstrates that the
Act compels states to negotiate with Indian tribes. The language is clear

in objectifying its purpose that the states4 shall play an active role in the

formation of Indian gaming operations."

The IGRA's compelled negotiation process requires that the states
act as draftsmen for the Secretary of the Interior, lending their regulatory
personnel and expertise to the drafting of comprehensive, detailed

regulations for Indian gaming." 5 The IGRA provides an exhaustive list
of the necessary provisions that may be included in the Tribal-State
compact to be submitted to the Secretary of the Interior." 6 The drafting
task is an onerous one, and one which falls squarely on the states. When

the IGRA was in the drafting stages, Senator Inouye remarked that "it is
simply not realistic for any but a very few tribes to set up regulatory
systems. '" 7 Having recognized that the states would bear the full burden
of drafting and creating these complex gaming procedures pursuant to
the IGRA, Congress clearly sought to use the states as its mechanism to

112. See Rumsey, 64 F.3d at 1256 (stating the "IGRA obligates the state to negotiate in good
faith with the tribe").
113. See Ponca Tribe 11, 37 F.3d 1422, 1436 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating the "IGRA does not
require the states to regulate Class II gaming by entering into tribal-state compacts"), rev'g in part
834 F. Supp. 1341 (W.D. Okla. 1992), afid on other grounds, 89 F.3d 690 (10th Cir. 1996).
114. See id.; see also 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i).
115. See25U.S.C.§2710.
116. See id. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(i)-(vii). The issues that may be addressed in the Tribal-State
compact include, without limitation, the following:
(i) the application of the criminal and civil laws and regulations of the Indian tribe or
the State that are directly related to, and necessary for, the licensing and regulation of
such activity;
(ii) the allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between the State and the Indian
tribe necessary for the enforcement of such laws and regulations;
(iii) the assessment by the State of such activities in such amounts as are necessary
to defray the costs of regulating such activity;
(iv) taxation by the Indian tribe of such activity in amounts comparable to amounts
assessed by the State for comparable activities;
(v) remedies for breach of contract;
(vi) standards for the operation of such activity and maintenance of the gaming
facility, including licensing; and
(vii) any other subjects that are directly related to the operation of gaming activities.
Id.
117. 134 CONG. REc. S12,650 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1988) (statement of Sen. Inouye).
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further federal Indian gaming policy. However, this compulsion of the
states to participate in the drafting of compacts that ultimately become
the basis of the Secretary's procedures is unconstitutional.
By forcing the states to negotiate pursuant to the IGRA's mandate,
the sovereign states are being used as pawns to further the federal
government's program to promote Indian gaming. In New York %,.United
States,"' the Supreme Court stated that "Congress may not
'commandee[r] the ... States by directly compelling them to enact
and enforce a federal regulatory program."' 9 By "commandeering"
negotiation, the IGRA compels de facto regulation.
Because the federal government offers no guidelines or wholesale
regulations for Class III gambling operations, it is the states' duty, under
the IGRA, to prescribe and proscribe the procedures for Indian
gaming'2 0 The federal government, in enacting the IGRA, merely set up
a general framework to structure Indian gaming, but the actual
administration and enforcement of the Act, falls exclusively on the
states, as the states are compelled to negotiate procedures which vaill
ultimately govern the tribal gaming operation. The states, therefore, are
reduced to draftsmen for the federal government-feather-tipped pens
writing procedure at the IGRA's command. In New York, Justice
O'Connor noted that the states shall not be conscripted as agents of the
federal government, 2' and here, under the IGRA, the states are just
that-henchmen, facilitating Indian gaming in accordance with the
IGRA.
With the Supreme Court's holding in New York that Congress is
prevented under the Tenth Amendment from compelling a sovereign
state to carry out a regulatory program in furtherance of federal policy,
the natural inference is that a state shall not be forced to adopt, or to
participate in any federally mandated program.-" "Although Congress
can urge a State, through various measures, to adopt a legislative
program that conforms to federal interests, it cannot compel the state to

118. 505 U.S. 144(1992).
119. Id. at 161 (first alteration in original) (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
120. See S. REP. NO. 100-446, at 13 (1988). reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3033

("Mhere is no adequate Federal regulatory system in place for class I gaming, nor do trib:s have
such systems for the regulation of class In gaming currently in place. Thus a logical choice is to
make use of existing State regulatory systems... ").
121. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992).
122- See id. at 188.
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regulate."' 3 In New York, the Court stated that the federal government
lacks authority to "conscript state governments as its agents"'' in the
rulemaking process, and under the IGRA, the states are plainly agents
carrying out federal policy at the government's command.
The circuit courts which have considered the Tenth Amendment
implications of the IGRA have parochially and erroneously held that by
merely compelling the states to negotiate with the tribes, but not
compelling them to ultimately enter into a compact pursuant to the
IGRA, the IGRA does not infringe upon the states' sovereignty, and
therefore, is not violative of the Tenth Amendment.' Professor Leon
Friedman, a leading scholar and author in the field of constitutional law,
notes that the "proposition that the States may be compelled to negotiate
as long as they are not ultimately compelled to consent to a compact...

has several flaws."'

Initially, he explains, that there is simply "no

constitutional basis" for these decisions. 2 7 "The cases do not (and

cannot) articulate any constitutional basis for the federal government's
authority to compel States to negotiate with Indian tribes."'2 He goes on
to argue that in holding that the states need only "negotiate," and not
ultimately come to a cogent working compact, the courts ignore the
onerous task that is inherent in the IGRA's negotiation procedure. 2
123. Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma, 834 F. Supp. 1341, 1346 (W.D. Okla. 1992), rev'd in part, 37
F.3d 1422 (10th Cir. 1994), affd on othergrounds, 89 F.3d 690 (10th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Ponca
Tribe 1].
124. New York v. UnitedStates, 505 U.S. at 178.
125. See, e.g., Ponca Tribe 11, 37 F.3d 1422, 1434 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating the "IGRA merely
directs the state to negotiate in good faith, and stops well short of imposing a requirement on the
states to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program"), rev'g in part 834 F. Supp. 1341 (V,D,
Okla. 1992), affd on other grounds, 89 F.3d 690 (10th Cir. 1996); Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v.
South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273, 281 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he IGRA 'gives states the right to get involved
in negotiating a gaming compact ... but does not compel it.' ... mhe IGRA does not force states
to compact with Indian tribes... and does not violate the [T]enth [Almendment.") (quoting
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 830 F. Supp. 523, 526 (D.S.D. 1993)); YavapaiPrescott Indian Tribe v. Arizona, 796 F. Supp. 1292, 1297 (D. Ariz. 1992) (stating the "IGRA's
terms do not force the State to enter into a compact").
126. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 15, at 22. In 1993, Professor Friedman, a
distinguished professor at the Hofstra University School of Law, represented developer, Donald
Trump, in an action against Bruce Babbitt, the then-Secretary of the Interior, on the grounds that the
IGRA was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' power, and more precisely, violative of the
Tenth Amendment. Although the case, and ultimately a decision, never came to fruition due to
extraneous factors, and is now moot, Professor Friedman's arguments and thoughts have proven to
be an invaluable authoritative asset in the writing of this Note. Any reference to Professor
Friedman's discussion will be signaled to the appropriate place in the Trump brief, cited as the
Plaintiff's Memorandum.
127. See id.
128. Id.
129. See id.
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"[C]ompelled negotiation impermissibly 'conscripts state governments'
as draftsmen for the Secretary's procedures (for which there are no
federal standards), requiring them to lend their regulatory expertise, draft
detailed compacts, and involve their personnel in comprehensive
regulation of Indian amn,g."'
B. Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma: The Tenth Circuit Upholds
the IGRA in the Heat of Tenth Anendment Attack
In Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma,3' the Tenth Circuit held that
"[b]ecause [the] IGRA merely directs the state to negotiate in good faith,
and stops well short of imposing a requirement on the states to enact or
enforce a federal regulatory program," the IGRA does not present any
Tenth Amendment infringement issues.'' 2 The court based its holding in
large measure on a dichotomy between two cases decided by the
Supreme Court, New York v. UnitedStates' and FERC v. Mississippi.l"
In Ponca, the court noted that if New York is understood to stand for the
proposition that the Tenth Amendment precludes Congress from issuing
a federal mandate that will require the states to enact or enforce a federal
regulatory program, "FERC instructs that Congress may require the
states to consider, but not necessarily adopt, a federal program.""
Following this logic, the "IGRA is more akin to the permissible statutory
scheme in FERCthan to the constitutionally infirm provision at issue in
New York. In essence, the states' duty ...to negotiate ...is nothing
more than a requirement... to craft a voluntary agreement."'"'

130. Id. at 22-23.
131. 37F.3d 1422(10th Cir. 1994), rev'g 834F. Supp. 1341 (V.D. Okla. 1992). rev'd on otler
grounds, 89 F.3d 690 (10th Cir. 1996).
132. Id. at 1434.
133. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
134. 456 U.S. 742 (1982). In FERC, the Supreme Court addressed Tenth Amendment

infringement concerns raised by the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA"). an
Act passed by Congress to deal with the nation's then-troubling energy crisis by utilizing the states'

natural and financial resources in various capacities. In assessing the propriety of Congress'
utilization and implementation of the states in the federal scheme to address the energy crisis, the
court noted as a threshold matter that it has never "sanctioned explicitly a federal comnmand to the
States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations:' Id. at 762. In so noting, the Court upheld

PURPA as it found that it did not fall into the category of such an intrusive command vhereby the
states would be forced to adopt a federally imposed directive and thereby forego indezpndent

autonomous decision-maling. See id. at 769-70. The Court concluded that -Titles I and Mllof
PURPA require only consideration of federal standards.... There is nothing in PURPA 'directly
compelling' the States to enact a legislative program." Id. at 764-65.
135. Ponca Tribe 11,37 F.3d at 1433.
136. Id. at 1434.
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In equating the IGRA to the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
of 1978 ("PURPA"), and in stressing the applicable FERCINew York
dichotomy, Ponca focused exclusively on a provision of PURPA that
"directed the state commissions to consider adopting federal rate
structures and regulatory standards."'37 Ponca "explained that this
provision did not impermissibly infringe on state sovereignty because its
language merely invited states to take action in a preemptible area.""'
Likewise, the court noted, because the IGRA only requires negotiation,
"the epitome of a discretionary act,"' 39 and does not command ultimate
Class HI gaming regulation, the "IGRA does not run afoul of the Tenth
Amendment."' °
Ponca's holding is based on the notion that negotiation is the
equivalent "of a discretionary act,"'' akin to the "consideration"
provision upheld by the Supreme Court in FERC.'42 Just as in FERC,
where the states were only mandated to "consider" a federal plan, and
not to adopt that federal program, under the IGRA, the states need only
negotiate in furtherance of a compact, and not ultimately reach a
compact. Essentially, according to the court, a state need only "consider"
and not "enact or enforce a federal" plan. 43 In justifying the IGRA's
constitutional rectitude, Ponca explained that although "Congress may
not usurp state discretion by commanding the states to enact or enforce a
federal [regulatory] program ....it may direct a state to consider
implementing a federal program so long as the states retain the
prerogative to decline Congress' invitation."' 4 In the court's view, the
"IGRA reflects Congress' attempt to encourage, but not mandate,
cooperative rulemaking between the Indian tribes and the states."'14'
Ponca stands for the proposition that because the IGRA does not
require an ultimate gaming compact and per se regulation, the Tenth
Amendment is not implicated or infringed upon by mere forced
negotiation procedures. 146 "The act of negotiating" is after all "the
epitome of a discretionary act.' 47 "By permitting the states ultimately to

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 1433 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 1436.
Id. at 1434.
Id. at 1436.
See id. at 1433.
See id. at 1433-34.
Id.
Id. at 1434.
See id.
Id. at 1436.
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abstain from exercising a regulatory role, [the] IGRA[ ...stands in
marked contrast to the statute in New York... .," In essence, it is

argued that the task of negotiation does not rise to the level of a federal
command "to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program"It ) as
forbidden by the New YorklPrintz line of cases. Not only is this holding
misguided in light of a plain meaning reading of the IGRA, it is further
antiquated and obsolete, in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Printz,where the Court held that any imposition on a state to carry out
the federal will is violative of the Tenth Amendment.")
C. The Utility of a PlainMeaning Reading: Parsingthe
IGRA for True Meaning
Referring again to the words of the IGRA, the Act maintains that a
"State shall negotiate,"' 5' not that a state shall "consider" negotiating, or
that a state shall have the "prerogative" to decline the offer to negotiate.
Simply, the state must take up its red pens and pencils, its yellow legal
pads, its costly lawyers, and its precious time, walk over to the
bargaining table, and labor to come to an agreeable resolution. There is
no option for the state that does not wish to negotiate at all; there is
simply no consideration whatsoever. "A critical alternative is missing in
[the] IGRA [and that is that] a State may not simply decline to regulate
Class IIgaming; it does not have the option of refusing to act.""2
The very potency of the IGRA depends upon the role of the states
in carrying out gaming regulatory negotiations. The legislative history of
the IGRA clearly demonstrates Congress' intention to "conscript state
governments as its agents"''" in the enforcement and carrying out of the
federal plan for Indian gaming. In a 1988 Senate Report discussing the
viability of the IGRA, the Senate "note[d] that there is no adequate
Federal regulatory system in place for [C]lass Ill gaming, nor do tribes
have such systems for the regulation of [C]lass III gaming currently in
place. Thus, a logical choice is to make use of existing State regulatory
systems."'" The states' role is thus clear; they are to be active in the
148. Id. at 1434.
149. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898. 935 (1997).

150. See id. at 925-35.
151. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (1994).

152. Ponca Tribe I, 834 F. Supp. 1341, 1347 (W.D.Okla. 1992). rerldin part, 37 F-1d 1422
(10th Cir. 1994), affdon other grounds, 89 F-1d 690 (10th Cir. 1996).
153. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144. 178 (1992).
154. S.REP.No. 100-446, at 13 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3083. \Vhen the
IGRA was still being considered and debated by the Senate, and still in its formative stages of
development, Senator Inouye remarked that "the Select Committee on Indian Affairs [did not) %iaw
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administration and enforcement of the IGRA. The IGRA states
unambiguously that a "State shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in good
faith to enter into.., a compact" when the state receives a request from
an Indian tribe to engage in "negotiations for the purpose of entering into
a Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of gaming activities."'
The negotiation procedure is an integral part of carrying out the federal
government's promotion of Indian gaming. It is the first step that brings
together a potent governing body and an Indian tribe in furtherance of a
gambling compact. Thus, preliminary negotiations practically translate
into the enforcement and administration of the IGRA. Ponca is therefore
incorrect in holding that the "IGRA reflects Congress' attempt to
encourage, but not mandate, cooperative rulemaking between the Indian
tribes and the states." '56 The IGRA, rather, is the product of a Congress
that impermissibly sought to utilize the states as units of federal
regulation. The forced negotiation proceedings are a part and parcel of
the overall regulation of the IGRA, and clearly the first and most integral
step in the proliferation of Indian gaming.
Professor Friedman argues that "[t]he compulsion of States to
participate in drafting compacts which ultimately become the basis of
the Secretary's procedures is unconstitutional because the federal
government lacks the authority to 'conscript state governments as its
agents' in the rulemaking process."'' 7 He goes on to note that "[e]ven if a
State ultimately does not consent to a compact, the proposed regulations
it has been compelled to draft and negotiate become the basis for the
'procedures' designated by the Secretary .... Thus, the States have been
compelled to become draftsmen for the Secretary"'58 "and this alone
violates the Tenth Amendment."'59
In Printz,the Supreme Court explained that a state shall not be used
as an implement for federal regulation, or as an outlet for Congress'
legislative product, no matter how slight the state's task may be.t" The
as meritorious any suggestions for the establishment of a Federal regulatory mechanism to duplicate
what already exists at the State level." 134 CONG. REC. S12,650 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1998)
(statement of Sen. Inouye).
155. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
156. Ponca Tribe I1, 37 F.3d 1422, 1434 (10th Cir. 1994), rev'g in part 834 F. Supp. 1341
(W.D. Okla. 1992), affd on other grounds, 89 F.3d 690 (10th Cir. 1996).
157. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 15, at 21 (quoting New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 178 (1992)).
158. Id. (citation omitted).
159. Id. at 19.
160. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929-31 (1997). Recall that at issue in Printz was
a temporary five-year provision found in the Brady Act, which provided that during the time period
while the federal computerized handgun check system was being phased into proper service, local
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Court rejected the government's position "that requiring state officers to
perform discrete, ministerial tasks specified by Congress does not

violate the principle' ' '6' espoused in New York, namely that "[tihe
Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a

federal regulatory program.""' Given that the Court found conducting a
computerized handgun background check'"3 to be too much of a burden
and an imposition on state sovereignty, it is very likely that today's

Supreme Court would find that the IGRA's forced negotiation procedure
qualifies as a burdensome task, in furtherance of the federal

government's policy to promote Indian gaming. One need only skim
through the IGRA's negotiation topics to discover that negotiation is
quite the extensive task,' 6 and surely it is in furtherance of the

enforcement of the federal government's plan for Indian gaming.
D. The Threat of FederalJudicial Reprehensionas a
Means to Compel State Negotiation
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe i.
Florida,'6 as a means to force states to comply with the negotiation

process, the IGRA maintained a federal cause of action that could be
commenced by a tribe if the state refused to negotiate a Tribal-State
compact, or if it failed to negotiate in good faith.'6 "Congress fully
contemplated and expressed its desire to give the tribes a federal forum
by which they could compel the states to negotiate fairly with
them.... Without such an enforcement mechanism, [the] IGRA could
not serve its purposes ... .,167

state law enforcement officials, already equipped with such capacity, woud be required to conduct
the handgun background checks for new gun purchasers. See id. at 902-05.
161. ld. at 929.
162. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
163. Such a "discrete, [and] ministerial taskH." Priniz.521 U.S. at 929.
164. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C) (1994). Webster's Third New International Dictionary
defines the term "negotiate" as:
1: to communicate or confer with another so as to arrive at the settlement of some
matter meet with another so as to arrive through discussion at some kind of agreement
or compromise about something: come to terms esp. in state matters by mzetings and
discussions ... 2 obs- to carry on business or tade... I a: to deal %,ith...: ?,tAGF.,
HANDLE, CONDUC ....
WEBsTER's THmD NEW INTERNATIONALDICONARY 1514 (3d ed. 1971).
165. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
166. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i). If a tribe brought such an action, and the federal court
found that the state had not negotiated in good faith, the court was required to order the state to
conclude the compact within sixty days of the order. See id. § 2710tdflt71B)Iiii).
167. Kickapoo Tribe of Indians v. Kansas, 818 F. Supp. 1423, 1427 (D. Kan. 19931.
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In 1996, the Supreme Court in Seminole held that the federal cause
of action created by the IGRA, whereby an Indian tribe can hale a
sovereign state into federal court, violates a state's sovereign immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment."' Seminole explained that under the
Indian Commerce Clause, Congress lacked the authority to abrogate the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, "and therefore § 2710(d)(7)
cannot grant jurisdiction over a State that does not consent to be sued."'69
"After Seminole, a tribe can no longer sue a state in federal court to
compel it to negotiate, but the statutory requirement that a state 'shall
negotiate ...in good faith' [nonetheless] remains intact" despite its
emasculated posture 70 Although the judicial enforcement provision is no
longer potent for all intents and purposes, it is still worthwhile to note, in
assessing the Tenth Amendment constitutionality of the Act, that
Congress, when drafting the Act, sought to employ the federal judiciary
as a mechanism to commandeer state compliance with the IGRA's
compact provisions.
E. Forcingthe States to Negotiate with the
Threat of the Unknown
Not only are the states compelled to negotiate explicitly by the
"shall negotiate" language, and by the threat of judicial reprehension,
they are also, as a practical matter, coerced into negotiations by the
automatic compact mechanism built into the IGRA, which finds its
potency to compel in its threat of forcing the unknown upon the states.
If a State and an Indian tribe fail to conclude a Tribal-State compact
governing the conduct of gaming activities on the Indian lands subject
to the jurisdiction of such Indian tribe within the 60-day period
provided in the order of a court ....
the Indian tribe and the State shall
each submit to a mediator appointed by the court a proposed compact
that represents their last best offer for a compact. The mediator shall
select from the two proposed compacts the one which best comports
with the terms of this chapter and any other
applicable Federal law and
7
with the findings and order of the court.1 '
If the State does not consent during the 60-day period ...to a
proposed compact submitted by a mediator ....
the mediator shall

168.
169.
170.
171.

See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 54-57.
Id. at47.
Levin, supranote 25, at 129 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A)).
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv).
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notify the Secretary and the Secretary shall prescribe, in consultation
with the Indian tribe, procedures-

(I) which are consistent with the proposed compact selected by the
mediator .... the provisions of this chapter, and the relevant
provisions of the laws of the State, and
(II) under which class I gaming may be conducted
on the Indian
"
lands over which the Indian tribe has jurisdiction.I

If a state does not come to an ultimate compact agreement through
the negotiation process, and "consent" to the compact selected by the

mediator from the two last best offers, or if a state simply chooses to not
negotiate at all,'" then the Secretary of the Interior, without reference to
any concrete federal guidelines, prescribes the procedures which will

govern Indian gaming in that state.'74 Given that there are no set federal
guidelines or regulations for Class ITl Indian gaming,"" these procedures
will be based on the Indian tribe's wishes, allusive adherence to the
IGRA, purported consideration of abstract state and federal law, and the
deductions and recommendations of a mediator who considers the
efforts and offers made by the state and the tribe.' 76 With such an allusive
plan, the states have no choice but to negotiate if they want to have any

influence over what will ultimately comprise the compact.
If the state does not participate, then it is left with no idea of what
type of procedures may be included in the agreement that will allow

gambling within its borders, or how the gaming facilities will be secured
to assure the safety of not only the gaming patrons, but also of the nonpatrons who may reside outside of the reservation. State officials cannot
know precisely what the procedures will contain, yet they will bear the

political consequences for not preventing whatever procedures the
Secretary decides to implement. Essentially, what occurs is that the

172. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii).
173. See id. § 2710(d)(7). In accordance wvith the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole, an
Indian tribe may no longer hale a state into federal court claiming that the state did not negotiate
pursuant to the IGRA. The states' possess sovereign immunity from suit by the tribes under the
Eleventh Amendment, and may only consent to federal jurisdiction. The Court found that the
IGRA's provision for a federal cause of action abrogates this sovereign immunity, and therefore
federal courts may not order states to negotiate. See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 55-57. Some
commentators note that without this federal cause of action. the states have no duty to negotiate, as
the courts may no longer order them to do so. See, e-g., Martha A. Field. The Seminole Case,
Federalism and the Indian Comnerce Clause, 29 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 3. 21-22 (1997): Levin, supranote
25, at 129; Joe Laxague, Note, Indian Ganing and Tribal-StateNegotiations: Who Should Decide
the Issue of Bad Faith?,25 J. LEGIS. 77, 81-82 (1999).
174. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii).
175. See S. REP. No. 100-446, at 13 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071,3083.
176. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii).
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states must negotiate, not only because of the pellucid language of the
statute, but also because of the unknown repercussions if they do not.
"Given this result, states might well prefer to engage in negotiations and
have their voices heard rather than stonewalling [the] tribes and having
their opinions ignored altogether."'" Even if the state chooses to stand its
ground, and forego being a party to the promotion of gaming within its
borders, such civil disobedience is only self-destructive. By
stonewalling, the state loses any right that it may have to oversee the
Indian operations, and thus it is compelled to negotiate in order to secure
its opinions. If the state does not negotiate, the local electorate will fault
the state officials for not working to further its best interests, and for not
representing it properly. "In order to avoid this political uncertainty,
State officials are compelled to negotiate."'' The "shall negotiate"
language is not merely directive on its face, it is also directive if it is
ignored.
F. PoliticalAccountability
In addition to the IGRA's compulsory negotiation provisions being
overly intrusive on state sovereignty, the IGRA's mandatory compact
mechanism also violates the Tenth Amendment because it allows the
federal government to shift political accountability for the national
gaming program established by the IGRA onto the states. In New York v.
United States,7 9 the Supreme Court noted that the touchstone of the
Tenth Amendment and the federal system is the concept of political
accountability.' so Political accountability ensures that state governments
will "remain responsive to the local electorate's preferences; [and that]
state officials [will] remain accountable to the people.""'' Such
accountability is curtailed where the federal government directs the
functioning of a state by compelling the state to regulate in furtherance
of the federal will. State officials cannot act on behalf of the local voting
public, carrying out its wishes, as they are constrained to act on behalf of
the national strong arm, namely, Congress. In full view of the electorate,
a state official may be compelled by a federal directive to regulate and
administrate a federally sponsored program, despite the fact that this
program may be in clear derogation of the ideals of the voters that put

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Levin, supra note 25, at 129.
Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 15, at 18.
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
See id. at 167-68.
Id. at 168.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol29/iss1/9

26

Cohen: In What Often Appears to Be a Crapshoot Legislative Process, Cong
2000]

INDIAN GAMING REGULATORYACT

the official in office.'" The likelihood is that the voters will be incensed
by their poor choice of a candidate, and when election day arrives, and
the opportunity is ripe, such voters will vote him out of office for

sponsoring a program that broke away from their shared party ideals.
But the true culprit was the federal legislature, and unbeknownst to the

voters, who only saw the state official act, the policy remains intact.
Answerability to the voting constituency on the part of the federal and

state legislatures has thus been clearly abrogated, and now the voters are
without knowledge of where recourse should properly lie. "[I]n order to

fulfill the ideal of popular control, the citizens must know which
officials are responsible for unpopular legislation."'"3 "[W]here the
political
Federal Government compels States to regulate,"'"

accountability is compromised.
Under the IGRA a state is required to assume an active role in the

negotiation process, lending regulatory expertise and personnel, drafting
contract clauses, and spending considerable time, effort, and money to

accomplish the federal government's goal of establishing Indian
gambling enterprises.'-r By indirectly employing the states in the
ultimate enforcement and procurement of IGRA establishments, it is the
states that appear to be promoting and facilitating gaming within its
borders. Therefore, it is the state legislature that "bear[s] the brunt of
public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory
program ... remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their
decision." ' 6

The IGRA permits Congress to avert political accountability for
Indian gambling because, whether or not state officials amiably adhere
to the IGRA, the local voters behold them as accountable for Indian
gaming.'" If state officials succumb and negotiate a compact, they seem

to be behaving deliberately, and the federal government escapes political

182. A prime example might be a conservative electorate voting into office a candidate ',ho
pledged to uphold its moralistic and traditional ideals, and then seeing the official not only stand
back and allow, but, further participate in, the proliferation of gambling enterprises in its loeality.
Even if the legislator may have had his hands tied by federal statutory mandate, the voting public
nonetheless will view this official as lax, as a turncoat, and as weak. This official will most likel) be
voted out of office, but the policy will remain intact %ith the voters unaare of %here to place
proper blame. Hence, the obscurity that federal coercion of state policy promotes.
183. Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a
Third Centurt;88 CoLUM. L. R-v. 1, 62 (1988).
184. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 168.
185. See 25 U.S.C § 2710(d)(3)(C) (1994).
186. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 169.
187. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 15, at 25.
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responsibility.'9 If state officials decline to negotiate, the Secretary of
the Interior commissions procedures, and state officials suffer the
electoral opprobrium for permitting the Secretary to impose unpopular
procedures and for not having negotiated a more suitable arrangement
when they had the opportunity.'
The IGRA does not authorize the states to "regulate" Indian gaming
operations per se; rather, the Act merely commands the states to
negotiate the provisions and procedures that will comprise the compact
and in effect, "regulate" the gambling enterprise.' 9 Although the states
do not possess the authority to regulate gambling on Indian reservations
in accordance with the voice and the views of their electorate, their
forced negotiation and participation in the perfunctory rulemaking
process gives the appearance that they, and not the federal government,
were instrumental in procuring Indian gaming within the states'
borders.' 9' The result is that the states are burdened with the political
accountability for the gaming on Indian lands, but deprived of the
requisite authority to regulate it.' 9
In California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,'" the Supreme
Court recognized that there exists no uncertainty whatsoever as to the
federal government's exclusive authority to legitimately regulate
gambling on Indian reservations.' 4 Congress, after all, exercises
"plenary authority over Indian affairs"'" "and surely the Federal
Government has the authority to forbid Indian gambling enterprises."'9 6
In that "authority to forbid" naturally lies the power to allow, and so
Congress clearly could have drafted the IGRA to allow solely for federal
regulation and oversight. Congress did not pursue this route, but rather,
purposefully, it drafted into the Act the role of the states as key players
in the establishment of Indian gaming. This ultimately begs the question:
Why? Why did Congress opt to employ state participation via the
mandatory compact mechanism where it could have otherwise regulated
for itself?
If Congress regulated for itself, then Congress, and Congress alone,
would assume responsibility for the IGRA's nationwide gaming
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See id.
See id.
See 25 U.S.C. § 2710.
See Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 15, at 26.
See id.
480 U.S. 202 (1987).
See id. at 221.
Id. at 215 n.17.
Id. at 221.
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program, and if it turned out to be unpopular or unembraced by the
electorate, then it alone would suffer the immediate effects of voter
backlash. Like a trail of breadcrumbs, the statutory policy would be
directly traceable to Washington, D.C. The benefit of using the states as
buffers, as administrative arms is clear; now the states will appear to be
promoting Indian gaming because of their own active participation in the
compact process. "Congress frequently attempts to insulate its actions
[purely] because it lacks the political courage to accept the consequences
of its political choices."' 9 7 When faced with "hard issues our
representatives quite shrewdly prefer not to have to stand up and be
counted[,] but rather[,]"' 9 choose to sit back, and allow another political
body to shoulder "'the inevitable political heat."""9 In the case of the
IGRA, that political body shouldering the heat is the sovereign states.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In romantic gambling lingo, when Congress drafted and enacted the
IGRA, an act purposefully designed to "entrench[] upon the sovereignty
that the Constitution preserve[d] for the states,":' it threw a pair of ones,
also known as snake eyes. With no compunction, the IGRA commands
the sovereign states to negotiate and draft hyper-technical regulatory
compacts that will ultimately govem the administration of large-scale
federally recognized Indian gaming enterprises. Clearly in derogation of
the Tenth Amendment and the New YorklPrintz line of cases, the "IGRA
compels the States to participate in the drafting of regulations for Indian
gaming, lending their regulatory expertise and involving their regulatory
personnel." 20' Despite the Supreme Court's admonishment of Congress
in New York v. United States that "[tihe Federal Government may not
compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program ' "
because the states are neither "political subdivisions,... regional offices

197. Handman, supranote 105, at 213.
198. ELY, supranote 100, at 132.
199. Id. (quoting Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process,
84 YALE LJ.1395, 1400 (1975)).
200. Ponca Tribe II, 37 F.3d 1422, 1432 (10th Cir. 1994) ("Congress, in enacting the Indian
Regulatory Gaming Act [sic], [sought] to coerce the Statels] in the exercise of [their] resred
contracting power[s]' and 'to commandeer the State[s'] aid in regulating Class Ill gaming.")
(quoting Defendants' brief at 37, 39), rev'g in part 834 F. Supp. 1341. 1346 (W.D. Oka. 1992).
aff'd on other grounds, 89 F.3d 690 (10th Cir. 1996); Ponca Tribe 1. 834 F. Supp. 1341, (W.D.
Olda. 1992), rev'd in part,37 F.3d 1422 (10th Cir. 1994), affdon other grounds, 89 F-1d 690 (10ih
Cir. 1996).
201. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 15, at 14-15.
202. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144. 188 (1992).
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nor administrative agencies of the Federal Government,"20 3 the IGRA
nonetheless forces active state involvement in, and tireless
administration of the federal program for tribal gambling. Such
compelled association "blurs the lines of political accountability
necessary for effective representative government.' 2 4
From a public policy and political accountability perspective, the
IGRA seems to be more of an invalid exercise of Congress' authority
than the provisions of the Waste Act struck down in New York, and the
background check provision of the Brady Act struck down in Printz.
Although all three Acts call on the states to carry forth the federal will,
"direct[ing] the functioning of the state ... , and hence...
2 5 the
compromis[ing] the structural framework of dual sovereignty,""
IGRA is unique in its craftiness to defer the ire associated with gambling
onto the states' political machine. By utilizing the states in the
proliferation of Indian gaming, Congress insulates itself from voter
reprehension, and forces the states to share the stage with it when the
heat is too much to endure. By shrewdly endowing the states with an
arguably slight or token involvement in the overall scheme of the
IGRA,2" the Act gives the impression that the state is the sole player in
furthering the gambling goals of the federal potentate, promoting the
federal government's will by active participation.
It is unlikely that any cross section of Americans would be opposed
to their elected state officials facilitating the federal government's war
on handguns given the dangerous social climate in today's school
systems, or that any rational constituency would be averse to their
officials aiding in the government's work to combat the improper
disposal of radioactive waste given the potential carcinogenic dangers
associated with such waste. Despite the holdings of New York and Printz
that any coercive use of the states as arms of federal control is violative
of the Tenth Amendment, the statutes at issue in those cases do not
conjure up images of state voters being utterly dismayed with the work
of their elected state candidates in furthering the federal plan.
Can the same truly be said for the IGRA? It is likely that the voting
public would be more consternated with the state assemblyman who
allowed Indian gaming to permeate the state's borders, than with the
assemblyman who advanced federal gun control. Gambling, by its very

203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.
Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 15, at 15.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932 (1997).
Albeit a tedious and rigorous engagement.
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nature, seems lascivious and menacing.2" It is a vice that exhibits
weakness

in the human condition, namely greed and habitual

surrender.0 3 Its effects are socially pervasive, causing job loss,
destruction of the family unit, and even loss of control of one's life'.:

Gambling is often associated with organized crime and nefarious activity
in general.2 '0 It is addictive, it is exhilarative, it is dangerous, and it is

just the type of activity that everyone wants to be a part of, but no one
wants to admit succumbing to and enjoying. Hence, the motivation for
Congress to shift part of the blame2 for a national program propagating
Indian gambling onto another goat. "
So what can be done; how can the IGRA be revamped to be

constitutional? Answered simply: Take the states out of it, or at least
give the states a choice of whether or not to participate; let the states
decide if they want to assume the political and economic responsibilities

associated with the IGRA. In New York, the Supreme Court explained
that Congress is constitutionally endowed with several alternatives that
allow it to validly impose coercive regulatory mandates on the states.2':
The first method is conditioning the receipt of federal funds, pursuant to

Congress' spending power.213 So long as the conditions "bear some
relationship to the purpose of the federal spending," Congress may
influence the legislative choices of a state by holding out the carrot that
207. See 141 CoNG. REc. S10,912-14 (daily ed. July 31, 1995) (statement of Sen. Simon).
"There is a substantial economic case to be made against gambling. It involves simply
sterile transfers of money or goods between individuals, creating no new money or
goods. Although it creates no output, gambling does nevertheless absorb time and
resources. When pursued beyond the limits of reation ... gambling subtracts from the
national income."
Id. 141 CONG. Rc. S10,914 (statement of Sen. Simon quoting Paul Samuelson, Nobel Prizewinning economist) (alteration in original).
208. See id. In a study noted in the Congressional Record, it was observed that in a pool of
addicted "problem" gamblers, 23% were found to suffer from alcoholism. 26% were chronic
overeaters, 22% were either divorced or separated, and 40% had been fired or recently unemployed,
due to their gambling addiction. See id. 141 CONG. REC. SI0.915.
209. See Jason D. Kolkema, Comment, FederalPolicy of Indian Gaming on Nvtvly Acquired
Lands and the Threat to State Sovereignty Retaining GubernatorialAuthori, over the Federal
Approval of Gaming on Off-Reservation Sites, 73 U. DEr. Mt'CY L REv. 361,371 (1996).
210. See James Popkin, Gambling with the Mob?: Vise Guys Have Set Their Sights an the
Booming Indian Casino Business, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 23 1993, at 30,30.
211. In fact, two members of Congress who had backed the bill that ultimately became the Act,
explicitly detached themselves from the subsequent national gambling program by articulating their
personal disfavor towards gambling generally. See 134 CONG. REc. S 12,653-54 tdaily ed. Sept. 15,
1988) (statements of Sen. McCain and Sen. Evans).
212. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 ("Our cases have identified a variety of
methods, short of outright coercion, by which Congress may urge a State to adopt a legislative
program consistent with federal interests.").
213. See id. at 167.
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is the federal purse.2 4 The second measure is "to offer States the choice
of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state
law pre-empted by federal regulation., 1 15 The third measure is for
Congress to invoke the Supremacy Clause, which allows Congress to
preempt and occupy a field of regulation entirely, and in so doing, deny
the states any role in the regulatory process." 6
Professor Friedman notes that in looking at Congress' second
option, the "'choice"' of regulating pursuant to federal standards or
outright preemption, it is important to observe that the "IGRA contains
no federal standards," and furthermore, the IGRA does not offer the
states any "such 'choice"' of qualified regulation or preemption.2"7 If
Congress were to utilize this method to urge the states to carry out the
federal plan for Indian gaming operations, Congress would first have to
implement elaborate federal standards to address each and every issue
that arises in gambling enterprises before this option is viable. States
would need the potential alternative before the option to choose can be
posed. Likewise, under the third option, complete preemption, although
the plan is viable to accomplish the goal of removing the states' role
from the IGRA, it is still not feasible as of yet, as Congress does not
offer any federal guidelines to govern gambling operations.
In conclusion, the only way to sustain state autonomy under the
Tenth Amendment, and to preserve clear lines of political accountability
in our federal system, is to redraft the IGRA excising the role of the
states in the proliferation of Indian gaming. The federal government
must regulate this controversial industry on its own-with its own
regulatory body, its own precepts, and its own efforts.
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214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de laCuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982).
217. See Plaintiffs Memorandum, supranote 15, at 15 n.9.
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